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UNITED STATES

v.
MAINE, et al.
SUMMARY:

[Special Master - \'Jalter E. Hoffman]
The Special Master found that Vineyard
..__..
.., Sound is

an historic bay and that its waters are therefore inland waters
belonging to Massachusetts.

________.....

The Special Master found that

Nantucket Sound is not an historic bay.
'"::::::;

Massachusetts has filed

exceptions to the Special Master's findings as to Nantucket
Sound arguing that the Special Master improperly required that
Massachusetts prove its title to Nantucket Sound by evidence
that was "clear beyond doubt."

The United States accepts the

Special Master's conclusions and has filed a reply brief
opposing Massachusetts' exceptions.
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BACKGROUND:

In January 1977, the United States and

Massachusetts filed a joint motion for supplemental proceedings
to determine the coastline of Massachusetts.

On June 29, 1977,

the Court appointed Judge Walter E. Hoffman to serve as Special
Master.

433 U.S. 917 (1977).

Originally, the dispute concerned

Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts Bay, Vineyard Sound and Nantucket
Sound.

In 1981, the parties agreed to a partial settlement.

The United States accepted Massachusetts' position on Buzzards
Bay and Massachusetts agreed to the position of the United
States on Massachusetts Bay.

The Court entered a supplemental

decree accepting the settlement.

452 U.S. 429 (1981).

The Special Master held hearings on the remaining issues in
October and November of 1982 and in June and July of 1983.

On

May 24, 1985, the Special Master filed his Report with the
Court.

On June 17, 1985, the Court ordered the Special Master's

Report filed and gave the parties 45 days in which to file
exceptions.

Massachusetts filed its exceptions on August 2,

1985 and the United States tendered a reply brief on
September 10, 1985.
At issue is the treatment of Vineyard Sound and Nantucket
Sound.

Massachusetts claims that it has historic or ancient

title to the Sounds and therefore they are inland waters belong
to Massachusetts.

The United States argues (a) that

Massachusetts never had title to the Sounds and (b) that in any
event, the United States has disclaimed title to the Sounds and
therefore the Sounds cannot belong to Massachusetts.

According

to the United States, the Sounds are territorial waters, or if
~

,

more than three miles from a coast, high seas.

MASTER'S REPORT:

To facilitate this presentation, I have

divided the Special Master's Report into five sections:

(1) the

legal setting for Hassachusetts' claim; (2) the United States'
disclaimer of Massachusetts' title; (3) the doctrine of ancient
title; (4) the evidence supporting Massachusetts' claims and (5)
the Special Master's evaluation of Massachusetts' claim.
1.

The Legal Setting.

The Master initially set

Massachusetts' claim of historic title to Vineyard Sound and
Nantucket Sound in the context of the present legal system.

He

explained that this Court has directed that the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. 5639 [hereinafter the Convention] be used
to define inland or internal waters.l

The Master noted that

Article 7 of the Convention sets forth rules of determining
whether a body of water is a bay and is therefore inland water.
Neither Sound meets the specific criteria for bays.

However,

Article 7(6) of the Convention provides that "historic bays" may
be treated as bays even if they do not meet the other criteria
listed in the Convention.
Massachusetts claims both Sounds under the "historic bays"
savings clause of Article 7(6).

The Master cited the following

passage from United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184-189 (1975),
to explain the elements of a valid historic claim:
The term "historic bay" is not defined in the
Convention. The Court, however, has stated
that in order to establish that a body of water
lciting United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 17-35
(1969) and United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 161-167
(1965). See also United States v. Ma1ne,
U.S.
53
U.S.L.W. 4151, 4154 (1985) and United States-v. LouiSiana,
U.S.
53 U.S.L.W. 4186, 4187 (1985).

,

is a historic bay, a coastal nation must have
"traditionally asserted and maintained dominion
with the acquiescence of foreign nations."
United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 172.
Furthermore, the Court appears to have accepted
the general view that at least three factors
are significant in the determination of
historic bay status: (1) the claiming nation
must have exercised authority over the area;
(2) that exercise must have been continuous;
and (3) foreign states must have acquiesced in
the exercise of the authority, Louisiana
Boundary Case, 394 U.S. at 75 and 23-24, n. 27.
The Master went on to find that an additional barrier to a state
advancing a claim of historic title was the possibility that the
United States "would disclaim that the disputed areas in fact
are historic waters."
2.

Report at 12.

The United States' Disclaimer.

United States disclaimed Massachusetts' title.
Master responded with two inquiries:

(a)

In this case, the
The Special

\lhether the United

States had effectively disclaimed "any intention on its part to
establish Vineyard Sound or Nantucket Sound as historic inland
waters"; and (b) what "burden of proof rests on Hassachusetts to
produce sufficient evidence to overcome the disclaimer."
The Special Master concluded that the United States'
attempt to disclaim historic title to the two Sounds "was
ineffective for the purposes of this litigation."
finding on two factors.

He based his

First, he noted that for two years,

from 1977 until 1979, the Coast Guard issued regulations
pursuant to the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, that applied inland water regulations to
vessels moving in both Sounds.

The regulations were changed in

1979 only after the Justice Department became aware of the
~

conflict between the regulations and the United States' position

'.

in this litigation.

Second, the Master noted that the United

States conceded the validity of Massachusetts' historic title to
Buzzards Bay, which title rested on the same kind of historic
evidence as Massachusetts' claim to Vineyard Sound and Nantucket
Sound.

The Master concluded "[T]he willingness of the United

States ultimately to concede an historic title which it had
disclaimed strenuously for almost four years makes suspect the
genuineness of its disclaimer to the Sounds."

Report at 20.

Despite his finding that the United States' disclaimer was
ineffective, the Master went on to consider what standard of
proof would be required in light of an effective disclaimer.
His analysis started with the Court's statement in United States
v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 175 (1965) that "[w]e are reluctant
to hold that such a disclaimer would be decisive in all
circumstances, for a case might arise in which the historic
evidence was clear beyond doubt."

The parties disagreed whether

this quote and subsequent cases established a "clear beyond
doubt" standard.

The Special Master concluded:

Were this a case of first impression, the Special
Master would be inclined to agree with Massachusetts
that the "clear beyond doubt" standard is an impossibly
high burden to impose on a state putting forth a
historic claim. However, the Supreme Court has had
the opportunity to ease the states' burden when it
considered the Special Masters' reports in the Florida
and Louisiana cases.
In both cases, the Supreme Court
overruled the States' exceptions; by implication,
therefore, the Court also affirmed the propriety of
the "clear beyond doubt" standard. Report at 24.2
3.

The Doctrine of Ancient Title.

turned to a discussion of ancient title.

The Master next

He explained that the

LThe Special Master, however, noted that to avoid needless
relitigation should the Supreme Court accept Massachusetts'
position, his Report would also indicate his conclusions "as to
the validity of the Massachusetts' claim under either standard."
(

doctrine of ancient title "can apply only to the acquisition of
territories which international law considers terra nullius,
land currently having no sovereign but susceptible to
sovereignty."

Applied to waters normally considered high seas,

a claim of ancient title requires that a state show that the
occupation took place before the freedom of the high seas became
part of international law.

The claim is based "on occupation as

an original mode of acquisition of territory," in other words,
"clear original title which is fortified by long usage."

Report

at 25.
The Master explains the difference between "historic" and
"ancient" title as follows:
Unlike a claim based on historic title, one
based on ancient title is not prescriptive, i.e., it
does not assert dominion over waters which belong
equally to all countries. A state making an ancient
title claim therefore need not prove all the elements
necessary to establish historic title. Effective
occupation, from a time prior to the victory of the
doctrine of freedom of the seas, suffices to establish
a valid claim to a body of water under ancient title.
Report at 25-26.
The Master found that the doctrine of ancient title is
recognized as a general principle of international law [citing
the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. 116] and
therefore is properly applicable to this proceeding as an
alternative to the doctrine of historic title.
4.

The Evidence Supporting Massachusetts' Claim.

The

bulk of the Special Master's Report is devoted to discussing the
legal and factual support for Massachusetts' claim.
discussed the material in three parts:

The Master

(a) Massachusetts as the

successor in interest to the British Crown; (b) the history of
activity in the Sounds; and (c) the 1881 legislation and
Vineyard Sound.

a.

Massachusetts as the Successor in Interest to

the British Crown.
Massachusetts argued that it has ancient title to the two
Sounds because:

(1) the Crown had title by way of discovery and

passed that title to Massachusetts through the Royal Charters of
1664 and 1691; or alternatively, (2) if the Charters did not
pass title, the Sounds were inland county waters under the inter
fauces terrae doctrine of the English common law.

The Master

found that both theories required that Massachusetts show that:
(a) "the two Sounds were indeed county waters under generally
accepted English legal theories during the colonial period"; and
(b) "assuming the general validity of an ancient title claim,
the Sounds were inland waters at the time that Massachusetts
acceded to the Union."

Report at 31.

The Naster concluded, based on English and American
precedents, that the county waters doctrine was "viable both in
English and American legal doctrine well into the nineteenth
century."

The Master also concluded that both Sounds were "the

kinds of bodies of water which both English and American
practice would have considered suitable for treatment as inland,
county water."

Report at 37 and 38.

The Master next studied the language of the Charters,
considered the practices of colonial times and reviewed this
Court's opinion in Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).

He

concluded that the Charters could have conveyed title to only
such "arms of the sea" as would have been recognized as county
waters or waters inter fauces terrae.

Report at 43.

This conclusion required a determination of the definition
of "county waters" and the application of the definition to the

two Sounds.

The Master found that three theories defining

county waters "had widespread acceptance and were used, either
singly or in combination with one another."

The first, and

oldest, was the "line of sight between headlands" theory.

Under

this theory, "if an individual standing on one headland could
see across to the other, then waters landward of an imaginary
closing line connecting the headlands could be treated as
inland."

Report at 44.

However, the authorities on this theory

contained conflicting statements as to the requisite degree of
visibility between headlands.
two competing theories.

This led to the development of

Lord Coke stressed the range of visual

knowledge, rather than the range of sight.

Coke limited county

waters to bays "where a man standing on one side of the land may
see what is done on the other."

A competing and more expansive

theory was propounded by Lord Hale.

Lord Hale wrote:

that arm or branch of the sea, which lies within
the fauces terrae, where a man may reasonably
discern between shore and shore, is, or at least
may be, within the body of a county; and therefore within the jurisdiction of the sheriff or
coroner.
M. Hale, De Jure Maris C.4, in S.A. Moore, History
of the Foreshore and Seashore and Law Relating
Thereto, 376 (1888).
The Master found that the Hale test was dominant at the time of
the Charters, but that the Coke test was dominant in the United
States by the early nineteenth century.
The Master noted that Vineyard Sound met both the Coke and
the Hale tests.
found that:

On largely uncontradicted evidence the Master

(1) a person was visible across Vineyard Sound's

largest mouth (less than six nautical miles wide); (2) "one
could see appreciably farther and more clearly in colonial times

than today"; and (3) due to erosion, Vineyard Sound's southwest
mouth is wider now than it was in colonial times.

Report at

48-49.
Nantucket Sound, however, presented a more complex
situation.
today.

Its mouth is approximately 9.2 nautical miles wide

The Master noted that Massachusetts conceded that its

claim to the sound could not be established under the Coke
test.

The United States argued that Massachusetts could not

prevail even under the Hale test.
and concluded

11

The Special Master disagreed

that Nantucket Sound meets the line of sight test

of Lord Hale and would be considered waters inter fauces terrae
before the Revolution.''

However, the Master went on to state:

Nevertheless, because of the ambiguity of the
evidence concerning the size of the eastern entrance
to the sound during the colonial period, the Special
Master cannot conclude that Massachusetts has proven
this part of its case under the 11 clear beyond doubt 11
standard of proof. Massachusetts can therefore
establish an ancient title to Nantucket Sound only if
the Supreme Court holds that the "clear beyond doubt 11
standard is inappropriate for this proceeding.
Report at 51.
This statement is critical as Massachusetts' bases its
exceptions on it.
b.

The History of Activity in the Sounds.

The Master then turned his attention to the history and
historical geography of the Sounds.

The Master found that (a)

an historic claim could be established "by evidence of an
effective and long-term exploitation of relatively small,
shallow, and at least partially landlocked bodies of water" and
(b)

11

Massachusetts has introduced sufficient evidence to support

a finding that the nature and extent of the colonists'
exploitation of the marine resources of the Sounds was

equivalent to a formal assumption of sovereignty over them.''
Report at 58.
c.

The 1881 Legislation and Vineyard Sound.

The Master also reviewed the impact of certain
Massachusetts legislation passed in 1881.

The legislation

directed the preparation of charts delimiting the State's
boundaries.
water.

The charts clearly showed Vineyard Sound as inland

The Master concluded that this legislation "operated as

an effective assertion of Massachusetts' sovereignty over
Sou~d

Vineyard

and therefore created an independent basis for

the present Massachusetts' claim to the Sound as historic inland
waters."

Report at 60.
5.

Evaluation of Massachusetts' Claims.

The Special

Master found that as to Vineyard Sound, Massachusetts

-

-

established its sovereignty under "the doctrine of ancient
..-.......
ti ~

_,..,

based on the royal charters and the county waters

--

doctrine (waters inter fauces terrae)" and also on historic
title.

Report at 61.

The Special Master, however, found that Massachusetts had

'------

failed to adequately prove its sovereignty over Nantucket
Sou~ pecifically,

the Speci

Master found:

Massachusetts has established to the Special
Master's satisfaction the fact that either the
United States or Massachusetts could have
treated Nantucket Sound as internal waters under
the legal principles applicable in the late
eighteenth century. Massachusetts has presented
considerable evidence to show that Nantucket
Sound was the kind of body of wat e r which
seventeenth and eighteenth century English law
could have treated as waters inter fauces terrae
and therefore capable of passLng to Massachusetts,
and has also shown convincingly that Nantucket
Sound formed a unique economic and geographical

I

)

unit during the colonial era. Both of these
factors, however, could only have served to
justify an exercise of jurisdiction. They are
insufficient by themselves to prove the
existence o an actual~tablish
jurisdict~ Nantuc"Ket Souna.
[t is
there ore t e SpecLa
as er s opinion that
the Commonwealth has failed to establish that
either the United States or Massachusetts
ever ass-ercecr-:t~ over the sound
until 'assachusetts L s
elatively
recen y.
Reporc--aE 64.

The Master, in finding that neither party had asserted
jurisdiction over Nantucket Sound, paid special attention to two
factors.

The first factor was the description of the customs

districts established by the First Congress.

The district for

Dukes County [Martha's Vineyard and the Elizabeth Islands]
included "all waters and shores within the county."

However,

the district for Nantucket included only the Island of
Nantucket.

The second factor was the evidence that

Massachusetts "failed to assert jurisdiction over the center of
Nantucket Sound until relatively recently."

The Naster noted

that it was unlikely that post-colonial Massachusetts ever
claimed the interior of Nantucket Sound because the
Massachusetts courts adopted the more restrictive Coke test and
that in the second half of the nineteenth century, the
legislature adopted a strict test claiming as inland water only
those arms of the sea with mouths of six miles or less.

The

Master pointed out that the official maps of Massachusetts
issued during the nineteenth century "failed to claim the
interior of Nantucket Sound for Massachusetts."

Report at 65.

The Master's Report concludes with a section rejecting the
United States' claim that the Sounds cannot be inland waters

f

(

because they are international straits and an addendum noting
the Court's February 26, 1985 opinion in United States v.
Louisiana,

U.S.

, 53 U.S.L.W. 4186.

The Master found

that the Court's opinion in United States v. Louisiana did not
change any of the Master's findings in this case.

The Special

Master's Report concludes with the recommendation that each
party bear its own costs and share the actual expenses of the
Special Master.
MASSACHUSETTS' EXCEPTION:

Massachusetts' basic argument is

that the Master found that Massachusetts had presented
sufficient evidence of ancient title to Nantucket Sound, but was
constrained from awarding the Sound to Massachusetts because he
erroneously believed that Massachusetts had to present evidence
that was "clear beyond doubt."
Massachusetts' brief is presented in two parts.

The first

part outlines Massachusetts' analysis of the Special Master's
Report.

The second contains Massachusetts' legal arguments that

it should not be required to establish its claim of ancient
title by evidence which is "clear beyond doubt."
1.

Analysis of the Special Master's Report

Massachusetts commences its review of the Special Master's
Report by noting that it no longer claims historic title to
Nantucket Sound and will only assert its claim under the
doctrine of ancient title.

Exception at 4.

Massachusetts

alleges that it established its title by showing that (a) the
Crown acquired title to the Sound by virtue of its discovery and
occupation in the colonial period, and (b) Massachusetts
acquired its title from the Crown by virtue of its colonial

f

Charters (or, at the latest, by virtue of the Treaty of Paris in
1783).

Exception at 4.

Massachusetts reads the Special Master's Report as holding
that whatever title the Crown acquired by discovery and
occupation passed to Massachusetts through the colonial
charters.

Exceptions at 4 citing Report at 43.

To establish

the Crown's title to Nantucket Sound, Massachusetts presented
evidence that the Sound was inland waters under the doctrine of
county waters and that in the colonial period, British colonists
in fact occupied the Sound.

The State points out that the

Master found that Massachusetts had adduced "sufficient evidence
to support a finding that the nature and extent of the
colonists' exploitation of the marine resources of the Sounds
was equivalent to a formal assumption of sovereignty over them."
Report at 58.
Massachusetts concludes that all that remained was "to
establish that the Sound qualified in the colonial period as
inland waters under the county waters doctrine."
5.

Exception at

Massachusetts contends that the Special Master found that

Nantucket Sound "would have been considered waters inter fauces
terrae before the Revolution," but concluded that this finding
was not established by evidence which was "clear beyond doubt"
because of the lack of evidence as to the exact width of the
mouth of the sound in colonial times.
2.

Exception at 6.

Legal Arguments against the use of a "Clear Beyond

Doubt" Standard of Review
Massachusetts first reviews the "Juridical Regime of
Historic Waters, Including Historic Bay" [1962] 2 Y.B. Int'l

f

Comm'n 1, O.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/143 (1962) (hereafter the Juridical
Regime) which the Court has considered authoritative,3 and
concludes that "there is nothing in the Juridical Regime that
even implies that a claimant state has to meet this exceptional
clear beyond doubt standard of proof, and every indication
therein is to the contrary."

Exception at 11.

Massachusetts

also reviews the International Court of Justices' opinion in the
Anglo-Norweigian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. Reports 116,
which the Master discussed, and finds that the characterizations
given to Norway's evidence of ancient title demonstrates that
the ICJ did not have in mind an "exceptional" standard of
proof.

Exception at 12.

Massachusetts concludes that the

exceptional standard is not required by international law.
Massachusetts next argues that even where there is a
disclaimer, the imposition of an extraordinary standard of proof
finds no support in policy or in the decisions of this Court.
The State makes a distinction between "the argument that a
disclaimer should be given conclusive or extraordinary weight
for reasons of policy, and the argument that it should be given
such weight because of its evidentiary significance to the
issues at hand."

Exception at 14.

question the second argument.

Massachusetts does not

However, Massachusetts rejects

the United States' suggestion that a disclaimer is entitled to
weight simply because a disclaimer is an exercise of its foreign
affairs power.

Massachusetts argues that this is "an argument

of opportunity" and that the Court has rejected the argument

~

~Massachusetts cites the Mississippi Sound Case, 105 S.Ct.
at 1080, United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. at 200 and the
Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 at 23-26, nn. 27-30, 76 n. 103.

'·.·l'

that a disclaimer is conclusive.

The State also argues that

under the Submerged Lands Act, Congress chose as a baseline for
state interests, the seaward limit of a state's inland waters
and left the task of delimiting inland waters to the Court
(citing United States v. California, 381 U.S. at 164-165).
Massachusetts distinguishes the Supreme Court cases that
the Special Master relied upon in imposing a "clear beyond
doubt" standard.

Exception 16-18.

Massachusetts recognizes

that Masters in some cases have construed the Court's opinions
to require States to prove historic water claims by evidence
which is "clear beyond doubt," but argues that those specific
rulings have never been confirmed by the Court.
Finally, Massachusetts contends that if an extraordinary
standard of proof applies, it only applies where there has been
an effective disclaimer by the United States and, here, the
alleged disclaimer is ineffective.

The State bases this

conclusion on arguments that (a) the disclaimer was not
unequivocal, (b) its genuineness is suspect and (c) "like the
alleged disclaimer the inland water status of Mississippi Sound)
it was adopted during the pendency of litigation with
Massachusetts."

Exception at 8.

Massachusetts concludes that it presented sufficient
evidence that a person could see across the entrance of
Nantucket Sound in colonial times so as to require a finding
that Massachusetts has ancient title to the Sound and that,
therefore, Nantucket Sound is inland water.
THE UNITED STATES REPLY:

Although the United States

supports the Naster's conclusion that Nantucket Sound does not

,

·'

''

"

..

'

qualify as inland waters,4 its reply takes issue with a number
of the Master's findings and conclusions.

The United States

argues that; (a) regardless of the standard for proof,
Massachusetts did not acquire ancient title to Nantucket Sound
in colonial times; and (b) any colonial title that might have
existed was lost either upon Massachusetts entry into the United
States or subsequently renounced by both Massachusetts and the
United States.

Finally, the United States argues that the

"clear beyond doubt" standard for evidence, although not
dispositive in this case, is the appropriate standard of proof
where the United States has disclaimed a State's claim of
historic title.
1.

No Inland Water Title to the Sound was Perfected in

Colonial Times
The United States advances three objections to any finding
of ancient title in Nantucket Sound.

First, the United States

argues that assuming the doctrine of ancient title is still
viable,S it requires effective occupation "from a time prior to
the victory of the doctrine of freedom of the seas" and that
except for the relatively brief period of
excessive Stuart pretensions, never fully
accepted by the world community, freedom
of the seas has been the prevailing
4The United States does not believe that the Master's
conclusion as to Vineyard Sound was correct. However, as the
only practical effect of the holding is to add a 1,000 acre
wedge to Massachusetts submerged lands, the United States
concluded that it "ought not burden the Court with this issue."
Rep 1y at 1 n . 1.
SThe United States suggests that a State may not today base
its claim on maritime titles that were last asserted in the 17th
and 18th centuries. Reply 6-8, n. 5.

international law regime since several
centuries before the alleged appropriation
of Nantucket Sound, especially where British
views held sway.
Reply at 7.
The United States second argument is that, even accepting
the more generous Hale line-of-sight test, Nantucket Sound does
not physically qualify for treatment as inland water.

The

United States contends that the doctrine of county waters only
applies to "a bay or estuary or gulf whose waters lie sheltered
'between the jaws of the land' culminating in mainland
headlands."

Reply at 9.

Nantucket Sound is defined, except at

the north, entirely· by islands, and therefore cannot be
considered an "arm or branch of the sea, which lies within the
fauces terrae" (or jaws of the land).
The United States third point is that the Master erred to
the extent that he found that there was "effective occupation"
of Nantucket Sound.

The United States describes Massachusetts'

evidence as
simply that the local inhabitants of the
area in colonial times took full advantage
of the natural resources offered by Nantucket
Sound - as would any coastal people, whether
the adjacent waters were "inland" or not.
Reply at 10.
2.

No Colonial Title Survives

The United States suggests that regardless of the Master's
finding of ancient title in colonial times, the Master was
clearly correct
in finding that neither the United States nor Massachusetts ever
asserted jurisdiction over the Sound until recently.

The United

States argues that (a) no colonial title survived independence
or the formation of the union, (b) any title that survived
statehood was later voluntarily renounced or abandoned by

'

'

Massachusetts, and (c) any colonial title that survived
statehood was effectively repudiated by the United States.
The Unted States notes that there is no inhibition to a new
sovereign renouncing a portion of the maritime territory enjoyed
by a preceding sovereign and that the United States has
repudiated "the sweeping claims once asserted in the ocean by
Spain, Mexico and Great Britain."6

Although one ought not

presume retrenchment, the United States argues that there are
very strong indications against the claim of ancient title in
this case.

It argues that:

(a) Justice Story as early as 1829

endorsed the Coke test - which Massachusetts concedes will not
embrace Nantucket Sound and inland waters, (2) in Commonwealth
v. Peters, 53 Mass. (12 Met.) 387 (1847), the Massachusetts
courts adopted a standard for inland waters that Nantucket Sound
could not satisfy, and (3) in 1859, the Massachusetts enacted
legislation limiting inland water to "arms of the sea" with
mouths of six miles or less.

The United States also contends

that now
[i]t is now well settled that whatever right
a State may have enjoyed in the marginal sea
and beyond as an independent nation were
surrendered to the United States upon acceding
to the Union. United States v. Maine, 420
U.S. 515, 522-523 (1975); United States v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717-718 (1950).
Reply at 12-13.
The United States concludes that the law and the facts support
the Master's finding that the United States, in fact, never
claimed Nantucket Sound as inland water.
6Reply at 11, citing United States v. California, 332 U.S.
19, 32 (1947). See also United States v. Lou~s~ana, 363 U.S. 1,
30, 71 (1960); Special Master's Report of October 14, 1952, in
No.6, Orig., O.T. 1954, United States v. California, at 37-38,
approved, 381 U.S. 139, 172-175, 177 (1965 .

The United States's argument that Massachusetts abandoned
its claim to Nantucket Sounds is based on the same evidence:
Justice Story's opinion, Commonwealth v. Peters, supra, and the
1859 legislative acts.

The SG also alleges that Massachusetts

did not advance any claim to the Sound until 1971.

The United

States fortifies its factual presentation by arguing that "a
loss of sovereignty and property rights can result from
abandonment."

The United States argues that although ancient

title is originally lawful appropriation and not a ·usurpation,
ancient title is relied upon only when the
claim is inconsistent with modern legal
standards; it is, in effect, a nonconforming use, entitled to be "grandfathered" only because it was established
before the current "zoning" rules v1ere
enacted. Accordingly, an ancient title
that offends prevailing international law
criteria is susceptible to loss by non-use.
Reply at 16.
Whatever claim to Nantucket Sound survived Massachusetts'
statehood, was lost through Massachusetts' failure to attempt to
exercise sovereign rights before 1971. 11 7
The United States also argues that its repudiation of
Massachusetts' claim to Nantucket Sound does not "work an
impermissible 'contraction of a State's recognized territory' in
violation of the constitutional principle embodied in Pollard v.
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) ."

Reply at 20-21. The United

States argues that a State's title to tideland and offshore
lands, once vested, is not indefeasible and that changes in
geography, whether natural or artificially caused, can deprive a
7Tfie United States suggests that the Master erred in
apparently assuming "that this position was reserved for straits
with a significant amount of international traffic." Reply at
18, n. 14.

f

..

State to title of the beds and shores of tidal waters.8

The

United States' conclusion appears to be that changes in legal
definitions concerning coastlines may also properly cause a
State's boundaries to expand or contract and that, in this
context, the federal Government's disclaimer is entitled to
consideration.
3.

In Li ht of the Federal Disclaimers

Massachusetts Must

Establish its Colonial Title and the Title's Survival by
Evidence "Clear Beyond Doubt"
The United States explains that it does not believe that
the Court need address the standard of proof issue.

However,

the United States argues that when, as here, the United States
disclaims an area as inland water, the State must prove its
title by evidence "clear beyond doubt."

The SG finds support

for the standard in the Court's recognition of foreign policy
concerns and the unique nature of historic inland waters.

A

claim of historic inland waters is by definition a claim that is
contrary to current international norms and therefore the claim
must be "open and notorious."

International law usually looks

to the United States to define, at least initially, its own
boundaries.

Thus, in the face of a federal disclaimer, the

State's evidence should be so strong as to justify a foreign
nation's failure to follow the federal Government's position.
Only title that is "clear beyond doubt" justifies the
~Reply at 21, citing Ore~on ex rel. State Land Board v.
Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.,29 U.S. 363, 372-378 (1977),
United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965), Hughes v.
Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967), California ex rel. State Lands
Commission v. United States, 457 U.S. 273 (1982) and the
Submerged Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1301).

f

embarrassment inherent in the rejection of the federal
Government's public stance.
DISCUSSION:

The case should be set for oral argument

because (a) the Special Master's Report does not clearly state
the MaSter's basis for holding that Nantucket Sound is not

-------

inland water, and (b) Massachusetts and the United States
disagree as to the basis of the Special Master's conclusion.
Massachusetts focuses on the Special Master's statement
that Massachusetts can establish ancient title to Nantucket
Sound "only if the Supreme Court holds that the 'clear beyond
~

doubt' standard i's inappropriate."

Report at 51.

Massachusetts

makes a strong factual argument that this is an unreasonably
high standard, at least where, as here, the Special Master found

_______....__

that "although the United States attempted to disclaim historic
title to the two Sounds, this disclaimer was ineffective for the
purposes of this litigation."

Report at 19.

The United States, on the other hand, focuses on the
Special Master's statement that Massachusetts "has failed to
establish that either the United States or Massachusetts ever
asserted jurisdiction over the Sound until Massachusetts did so
relatively recently."9

Report at 64.

The United States argues

that this finding is dispositive because it means that even if
Massachusetts once had ancient title to Nantucket Sound, it lost
9This finding is a little confusing in light of the Special
Master's earlier finding that the United States' attempted
disclaimer was ineffective. How can the United States disdain a
claim that has not been asserted?

(

that title by failing to assert it.lO

The United States makes a

strong argument that a claim of ancient title, like a claim of
historic title, may be lost if it is not openly and notoriously
asserted.

However, neither the Special Master nor Massachusetts

directly address this issue.
Since the Court must consider whether a claim of ancient
title is lost if not openly asserted, it may wish to also
address the United States' other objections to the Master's
treatment of the doctrine of ancient title.

Three of the United

States' arguments are that (1) the doctrine of ancient title was
discredited before ·England colonized Massachusetts, (2) the
doctrine of ancient title is not applicable to Nantucket Sound
because the Sound is formed by islands and not by the jaws of
the mainland, and (3) Massachusetts' evidence of the colonial
use of the natural resources of the Sound does not by itself,
regardless of its quantum, establish "effective occupation."
None of the United States' arguments are addressed by
Massachusetts and while the Master's finding appear to be
adverse to the United States' position, his reasoning, where
expressed, is not clearly persuasive.
In light of the ambiguity of the Master's reasoning, the
parties' disagreement over what the Master actually held and
Massachusetts' failure to anticipate or reply to the United
States' arguments,ll the Court has little choice but to set the

lOr£ the United States is correct, there is no standard of
proof issue. There was no evidence before the Master of any
assertion of jurisdiction by Massachusetts or the United States
before 1971. There was evidence of disclaimers. Thus, under
any standard of proof, Massachusetts would not prevail.
liThe United States' reply brief was filed on September 10,
19D5, and Massachusetts has not filed a response. However, it
is not clear that Massachusetts is entitled to file a response
to a reply brief. The Court might consider requesting further

-

case for oral argument.

Lj

-

Argument should help the Court

determine which issues are dispositive and need to be decided.
Depending on which issues prove to be persuasive, the Court may
(1) adopt the Master's conclusions, (2) accept Massachusetts'
exceptions or (3) refer the case back to a Master for further
proceedings.
CONCLUSION:

Neither party has filed exceptions to the

Master's conclusion that

Vi ~nd

conclusion appears to be correct.l2

is inland water and that

However, Massachusetts

takes exception to the Master's conclusion that Nantucket Sound
is not inland water and the parties reasonably disagree as to
how the Master reached his conclusion.

Under these

circumstances, the Court should set the case for oral argument.
The United States has filed a reply to Massachusetts'
exceptions.
9/25/85

Schickele

12Massachusetts submitted considerably more evidence on
Vineyard Sound than on Nantucket Sound. The Master found that
Massachusetts had demonstrated that it had both ancient title
and historic title to Vineyard Sound. A review of
Massachusetts' evidence in light of the Court's discussion of
historic title in United States v. Louisiana,
U.S.
, 53
U.S.L.W. 4186 (February 26, 1985) suggests tha~assachusetts
has historic title to Vineyard Sound even if it does not have
ancient title to the Sound.
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Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Bill

DATE:
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United States v. Maine, et al., No. 35 Original
Exceptions to Special Master's Report
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lftr'I-3 sole remaining

N:mtucket

Sound

-----

is

an

issue in this case is whether

"historic

bay,"

and

is

therefore

"inland water" under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953.

If

Nantucket Sound is an historic bay, then Massachusetts has
title to it.

If not, the Sound either belongs to the

or

of

is

part

the

high

seas.

The

Special

u.s.

Master

-

determined that the Sound is not "inland water."
Massachusetts claims that the Sound is an historic
bay

because

the

state has

"ancient

title"

to

it.

The

thited States counters that it has formally disclaimed the

"

Sound's

inland water

status, and that Massachusetts must

fuerefore establish its ancient title by evidence which is
"clear
~gues

beyond

doubt."

In

addition,

the

United

States

that Massachusetts' title lapsed, because the state

~.

failed

to assert

jurisdiction over

the Sound for

a

long

t::er iod of time.
'Ihe parties disagree

as

to just what the Special

~

Master

found,

but

retermined that

(1)

it

appears

that

by

the

---------------(2) the United

----

(3)

-

is

but

evidence,

cbubt";
and

Special

Master

Massachusetts' ancient title claim is
-----~

supported

the

~

not

~

"clear

beyorrl

States' disclaimer was ineffective;

Massachusetts failed to assert jurisdiction over

fue Sound for a long period of time, ending only recently.
If

I

correctly understand

finding

makes

exceptions
mether

the

thus

first

miss

the underlying

two

the

point,

the state must prove

beyond doubt" standard.

irrelevant.
because

Massachusetts'
they

its title under

In short,

t?_: third ~

law,

focus

the

on

"clear

it appears to me that

fue Master's conclusion was probably correct.
The memo writer recommends that the case be set for
~gument

agree,

to clarify the parties' positions.
although

I'm

not

sure

how

much

~nefit from oral argument in this case.

I tentatively
the

Court

If my

will

initial /

view on the merits proves to be correct, the case should
perhaps be disposed of in a brief per curiam affirming the
Master's findings.
l..,___----
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October 11, 1985 Conference
List 5, Sheet 6
Motion of Massachusetts
for Leave to File Reply
Brief

No. 35 Original
UNITED STATES

v.
MAINE, et al.
SUMMARY:

On June 17, 1985, the Court ordered that the

Special Master's Report be filed and allowed exceptions to be
filed.

On August 2, 1985, Massachusetts filed its exceptions to

the Special Master's Report.

On September 10, 1985, the United

States filed its reply brief which supports the Master's
recommendation but objects to his reasoning.l

Massachusetts

requests leave to file a reply to the United States' objections
to the Special Master's findings and conclusions.
lsee the Legal Office's memorandum on the exceptions to the
Master's Report prepared for the September 30, 1985 Conference.
On October 7, 1985, the Court ordered the exceptions set for
oral argument.

(012-AJJ,.- lu.vt.- .Jo
(

fl...

'""f1 fn;~ ~·ll

CONTENTIONS:

In support of its motion for leave to file a

reply brief on or before October 25, 1985, Massachusetts
advances three arguments:

(1) the United States' reply brief

exceeds the proper scope of a reply brief; (2) the United
States' reasons for the scope of its reply brief are unsound;
and (3) in any event, fairness requires that Massachusetts be
permitted to respond to the reply brief filed by the United
States.
Massachusetts argues that because the United States filed
no exceptions to the Special Master's Report, it may not in its
reply brief, "mount a broad-based attack on the Special Master's
findings and conclusions."

Massachusetts alleges that the

United States in its reply brief makes arguments that were never
briefed to the Special Master and relies on "alleged evidence
which was either never introduced, or never referred to in the
arguments to the Special Master."

Massachusetts then lists

eight arguments advanced by the United States which
Massachusetts claims were rejected, explicitly or implicitly, by
the Special Master or not raised before the Special Master.
Massachusetts' second argument is that the Court's June 17,
1985 order "cannot reasonably be read to authorize the parties
to reserve arguments against the Special Master's findings and
rulings until the reply brief."

Massachusetts notes by example

that in United States v. Florida, 420 U.S. 531, 533 (1975), "the
Court declined to decide arguments raised by the United States
for the first time in exceptions, and instead referred them back
to the Special Master."

f

Hassachusetts concludes that although

the procedures for original cases are not prescribed by statutes
or rules, this does not excuse the United States from complying
with the Court's June 17, 1985 order.
Massachusetts' final argument is that fairness requires
that it be given an opportunity to respond to the United States'
reply brief.

Because the reply brief exceeds the usual scope of

a reply brief and raises issues allegedly not presented to the
Special Master, Massachusetts could not anticipate the arguments
advanced by the United States.

Massachusetts suggests that its

oral arguments will be ''ineffectual" if it cannot, before
argument, refer the Court to those portions of the record that
rebut the points raised by the United States.
The SG has submitted a response to the motion defending the
United States' reply brief, but agreeing that Massachusetts
should be allowed to file a reply brief.
DISCUSSION: The motion for leave to file a reply brief
should be granted.

The United States' reply brief does raise

several issues that are not explicitly addressed by the Special
Master and are not directly responsive to Massachusetts'
exceptions.

Massachusetts could not have anticipated that the

United States would raise these issues.

A reply brief by

Massachusetts should help the Court both in determining which of
the United States' issues should be considered and in resolving
these issues.
A reference of an original case to a Special Master is
analogous to a DC's reference of a case to a magistrate.
the DC, the Court is responsible for the findings and
conclusions which are entered.

(.

.

Therefore, the Court may

Like

consider challenges to a Special Master's Report, even though
they are untimely or were not raised before the Master.

For

example, in United States v. Florida, supra, the United States
raised in its exceptions to the Special Master's Report,
contentions which it had not presented to the Master.

The Court

did not ignore the late contentions, instead it referred them to
the Master for consideration.

Massachusetts' reply brief will

refer the Court to evidence and portions of the Master's Report
which, in Massachusetts' opinion, refute the arguments advanced
by the United States.

This should help the Court determine

whether the issues are ripe for disposition or require further
development.
Granting the motion will not inconvenience the Court.
Although the Court has ordered the exceptions set for oral
argument, there is no urgency in the case (the original
reference to the Master was made in 1977).

Argument can be put

off until after the reply brief has been received.
CONCLUSIONS:

The motion by Massachusetts for leave to file

a reply brief should be granted.

---------

The United States filed a

reply brief of unusual scope containing several arguments that
could not have been anticipated.

A response to those arguments

should be helpful to the Court in its review of the Special
Master's Report.
There is a response.
10/8/85
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

December 3, 1985

Cabell
No. 35, Original,

u.s.

v. Maine (~U~

Exception to Report of Special Master Walter E. Hoffman
Wednesday, December 11, 1985 (1st case)

~

Questions Presented
1.

Does Massachusetts possess title to Nantucket Sound

if the burden of proof is merely to "persuade[] the finder of its
claim"?

Mass.Br. 7.
2.

Did the Special Master err in applying a "clear be-

tween a State and the United States?

I.

BACKGROUND
This case arises from the United States' action to quiet

title

commenced

in

under

the

that

seeks

1968.

possession

\A

theory

n

"c

-

it l],ad ancient

title even

if

it did not

have historical title.

and

There

is an

"historic

title"

have relied

waters

{the

traditional

basis

upon

which

States

in claiming sovereignty over disputed waters).

title~requires

cient

important contrast between "ancient title"

that the claimant show that it

in question and

~ (

An-

occupied~he

"'that the occupation took place before

the freedom of the high seas became part of international law."
Because ancient title does not
eignty

over

countries,

waters
a

state

involve

the assertion of sover-

that otherwise would belong equally
claiming

ancient

title

"therefore

to all

need

prove all the elements necessary to prove historic title.

not

Effec-

tive occupation, from a time prior to the victory of the doctrine
of freedom of the seas, suffices to establish a valid claim to a
body of water under ancient title."

Report 25-26.

In establishing ancient title through a series of legal
tests that are irrelevant here, Massachusetts had introduced evidence

that someone standing on the Great Point could have seen

the southern shore of Cape Cod at points where the Sound is wider
than it is at the eastern mouth.

The

E~al Mast~

concluded

that:

~Nantucket Sound meets the line of sight test of Lord
Hale and would have been considered waters inter fauces
terrae before the Revolution.
Nevertheless, because of
the ambi ~idence concerning the size of
the eastern entrance to the sound during the colonial
period, the Special Master cannot conclude that Massa-

chusetts has proved this part of its case under the
'clear beyond doubt' standard of proof.
Massachusetts
can therefore establish an ancient title to Nantucket
Sound OJ}_l,y if the Supreme Court holds that the 'clear
beyond doubt' standard is inappropriate for this proceeding." S.M.Rpt. 51.
The
grounds

to

United
support

States
the

advances

a

number

Special Master's finding

of

I 5 f-IIY.--..__.J'~"~_h.__.."i
.,..,)

alternative

that Massachu-

setts failed to establish continuing ancient title over Nantucket
Sound.

It begins by noting that:

"Had we the courage of our convictions, we would rest
with a mere reference to pages 64 and 65 of the Report
in which the Special Master unequivocably [sic], and
unanswerably' disposes of f:he commonwea!Eh Is -claim to
Na~ ~ound By demonstratin that an e~lier title
to ·
a
a
ng s
apse •
e a ter 's
conclusion there 1s un
and plainly does not
depend on the standard
required of Massachusetts--the only matter
its present brief is
addressed." u.s.Br. 2.
Even if Massachusetts did prove that it once had ancient title to
the Sound, and that is all the Special Master's alternative finding concluded, Report 51, the critical issue is whether that ancient title survived.

II.

DISCUSSION
Although it appears that the United States is correct in

arguing

that

Massachusetts

must

meet

burden, that question is irrelevant.

a

heightened

Massachusetts has failed to

the other half of the ancient title test:

-------

sovereignty has been exercised continuously.

''

evidentiary

showing that

A.

Ancient Title
Massachusetts has conceded that it failed to demonstrate

-----

....

~

a

sufficient continuing

exercise of

----

~

sovereignty over

-:-

Nantucket

Sound to justify a finding of historic title , but contends that
it has a
that Massachusett's claim to historic title had lapsed during the
nineteenth

century

because

Massachusetts

adopted

a

restricted

definition of its coastal waters that could not be met with respect to Nantucket Sound under any standard of proof.

Assuming

for a moment that Massachusetts could establish that it once had
ancient title -- I deal with the burden of proof question below - the Special Master's findings concerning the lapse of historic
title mean that any claim to ancient title would similarly have
lapsed.
Massachusetts argues
quired

to

show

retention

of

that the quantity of evidence resovereignty

is

significantly

less

than the quantity of evidence required to show establishment of
sovereignty.

"While it is theoretically possible in internation-

al law for a sovereign title to territory to be 'abandoned,' actual

instances therefore are exceedingly rare."

23.

In other cases, gaps of over two centuries did not consti-

tute abandonment.

Reply Br .Mass.

Ibid.

But it appears that the cases and commentators dealing (

lapse

in

the

do not

distinguis~ ~!!! b~~ EI?" ~d

and a

lapse

former.

in the

Moreover,

they

latter would also mean a
seem to assume that some

continuing evidence of sovereignty is necessary.

,,.

See,

~g.,

Case

of

the

French

Minquiers
and

original
tained

and

English

title

and

Ecrehos,

claims
and

never

that

that

lost 11 ) ;

1953

I.C.J.

each

their

47,

possessed

title has

Anglo-Norwegian

53

(describing

an

ancient

11

or

always been main-

Fisheries

Case,

1951

I.C.J. 116, 133 (finding relevant .. certain economic interests •..
the reality and

importance of which are clearly evidenced by a

long usage 11 ) ; Juridical Regime 34,
"a clear original title which
Blum,

Historic

Titles

in

,I 71 (ancient title based on

is fortified by long usage") ; Y.

International

Law

250

(ancient

title

"can be recognized to-day only if the claimant state is in a position to prove that it asserted its authority over the allegedly
historic waters since the emergence of the relevant rules of the
modern international law of the
Massachusetts

would

sea")~

have

to

show

that

its

claim

was

maintained after the acceptance of the doctrine of the doctrine
of the freedom of the high seas. Although the Special Master did
not address this element in his discussion of ancient title, he
did in his discussion of historic title.

He found that, far from

continuing to exercise sovereignty over the center of Nantucket
Sound,

" [ i 1t

is

unlikely

that post-colonial Massachusetts ever

claimed the interior of Nantucket Sound."

Report 65.

It effec-

tively disclaimed sovereignty, both judicially, through its adoption of a

boundary

test that cannot be met by Nantucket Sound

(the Coke test), and administratively, through the publication of
official maps
The

Special

that

failed

Master's

to claim the

finding

that

11

interior

Whatever

of the Sound.

rights

[Massachu-

setts] may have had over Nantucket Sound during the colonial pe-

riod lapsed until the Commonwealth's recent attempt to resuscitate

them,"

ibid,

must

logically

include

its

ancient

rights

since, because the colonial period antedated freedom of the high
seas, the rights Massachusetts may have had were necessarily ancient rights.
Massachusetts essentially argues that the findings with
respect to the lapse of historic title are insufficient to support a finding that the ancient title has also lapsed.

But

(1)

Its reliance on the "leading case" involving the Channel Islands,
Case of the Minquiers and Ecrahos, 1953 I.C.J.
because the Court did not find

a

47,

is misplaced

total gap in the exercise of

jurisdiction in excess of two centuries to be irrelevant to the
assertion of sovereignty:

( 2) There is no reason a lesser stand-

ard of proof should apply to ancient titles, and because the frequently extravagent ancient titles carve out an exception to the
presumption of freedom of the high seas that is even greater than
that of historic titles, the standard possibly should be higher:
and

(3)

title

The Special Master's discussion of the lapse of historic

shows

that

the

issue of continuing

jurisdiction was not

even close.

/

B.

The Burden of Proof
If

the Court reaches

this question,

I

am persuaded by

the United States' argument that the nature of the federal system

___
---

counsels placing a heavy burden on
tested by the United
_, States.
-:;--

may be necessary.

'I•

are con-

Some elaboration on that standard

The contrast in United States v. California,

381

u.s.,

at 175, and the Louisiana Boundary Case,

u.s.,

394

at

77, between evidence that is "clear beyond doubt" and "questionable evidence" suggests that

"clear beyond doubt" is merely the

Court's way of describing the kind of evidence likely to overcome
an effective disclaimer.

Thus the apparent amalgam of two dif-

ferent conventional evidentiary standards -- "clear and convincing" and
was

not

instead

"beyond

reasonable doubt"

trying

to expound

a

trying

to

the

convey

-- suggests

new evidentiary
heightened

that

the Court

standard,

showing

but was

required

by

States whose territorial claims are contested by the Federal Government.

Moreover, I believe that the heightened standard should

apply to State claims whether or not the United States explicitly
disclaimed the State's position prior to litigation,

and there-

fore agree with the Special Master's seeming paradoxical application of a heightened standard of proof after he found no effective disclaimer.

III.

CONCLUSION
I

recommend overruling Massachusetts'

exception to the

Special Masters Report without reaching the question of burden of
proof.

December 3, 1985

Cabell

Bench Mem.

Argued 12/11/85
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SUPREME COURT OF mE UNITED STATES
No. 35, Orig.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF v.
STATES OF MAINE, NEW HAMPSHIRE, MASSACHUSETTS, RHODE ISLAND, NEW YORK, NEW JERSEY,
DELAWARE, MARYLAND, VIRGINIA, NORTH CAROLINA, SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDA
ON BILL OF COMPLAINT
[January-, 1986]

JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question now before the Court is whether Nantucket
Sound qualifies as "internal waters" of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts rather than partly territorial sea and partly
high seas as the United States contends. We agree with the
Special Master's conclusion that the Commonwealth's claim
should be rejected.
I
Pursuant to an earlier decree of this Court, 1 the United
States and Massachusetts in 1977 filed a Joint Motion for
Supplemental Proceedings to determine the location of the
Massachusetts coastline. After our appointment of a Special
Master, 433 U. S. 917 (1977), the parties agreed on a partial
settlement, which we approved in 1981. 452 U. S. 429.
' In 1968 the United States invoked our original jurisdiction to quiet title
to the seabed along the coast of the Atlantic Ocean. In 1975 we entered a
decree affirming the title of the United States to the seabed more than
three geographic miles seaward of the coastline, and of the States to the
seabed within the three geographic mile zone. United States v. Maine,
423 U. S. 1 (1975). See also United States v. Maine, 420 U. S. 515 (1975).
In that decree we reserved jurisdiction which either the "United States or
any defendant State [could] invoke . .. by filing a motion in this Court for
supplemental proceedings. " 423 U. S., at 2.

t.1.~
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Left unresolved was the status of Vineyard Sound and Nantucket Sound, a dispute which gave rise to extensive hearings before the Special Master. The Master concluded that
Vineyard Sound is a "historic bay" and therefore a part of the
inland waters of Massachusetts. However, he reached a
contrary conclusion concerning Nantucket Sound. Explaining that the decision concerning Vineyard Sound has only
minimal practical significance/ the United States has taken
no exception to the Master's report. Massachusetts, however, has excepted to that part of the report concerning Nantucket Sound. Specifically, although Massachusetts acquiesces in the determination that the doctrine of "historic title"
does not support its claim, it continues to maintain that it has
"ancient title" to Nantucket Sound.
Nantucket Sound is a relatively shallow body of water
south of Cape Cod, northeast of the island of Martha's Vineyard, and northwest of the island of Nantucket. Massachusetts contends that the English Crown acquired title to this
territory as a result of discovery and occupation by colonists
in the early 17th Century and that it succeeded to the
Crown's title by virtue of various Royal Charters or by the
Treaty of Paris, which ended the Revolutionary War. 3
2

According to the Solicitor General, all but 1,000 acres of the submerged lands of Vineyard Sound belong to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as underlying territorial waters, even under its view that those
waters are not inland.
3
In particular, the Commonwealth points to the charter granted in 1664
by King Charles II to the Duke of York conveying title to New York, New
Jersey, and most of New England, cf. Martin v. Waddell, 16 Pet. 367,
413-414 (1842); Mahler v. Norwich & N . Y. Transp. Co., 35 N. Y. 352, 355
(1866), and to the charter granted in 1691 by the English monarchs William
and Mary to the colonists of Massachusetts consolidating into "one real!
Province by the Name of Our Province of the Massachusetts Bay in New
England" the territories and colonies that were then commonly known as
Massachusetts Bay, New Plymouth, ''the Province of Main" and the territory called Accadia or Nova Scotia, see Mass. Ex. 45, p. 8. Alternatively,
Massachusetts asserts that it acquired sovereignty over the area by virtue
of the Treaty of Paris signed in 1793. Cf. Manchester v. Massachusetts,
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To prove that Great Britain acquired .title to Nantucket
Sound which it could pass to Massachusetts, much of the evidence presented to the Special Master concerned whether
Nantucket Sound would have been considered "county waters" under English law in the 17th century. Under the
"county waters" doctrine, waters "inter fauces terrae" or
landward of an opening "between the jaws of the land" could
be subject to the jurisdiction of the littoral county rather than
the Admiral if the jaws were close enough to each other to
satisfy a somewhat ambiguous line-of-sight test. Under
Lord Coke's version of the test a person standing on one jaw
must be able to "see what is done" on the other jaw; 4 under
Lord Hale's more expansive version, it is merely necessary
that "a man may reasonably discern between shore and
shore." 5
The relevant jaws of land in this case are the southern tip
of Monomoy Island, which extends south from the elbow of
Cape Cod, and the northern tip of Nantucket Island. At the
present time, those two jaws are 9.2 nautical miles apart, but
the distance may have been greater in colonial times. In any
event, the parties agree that the distance was too great to
satisfy Lord Coke's version of the test. Whether it would
meet Lord Hale's test depends, in the opinion of the Master,
on whether the Commonwealth's burden of proof is merely to
persuade by a preponderance of the evidence or by evidence
139 U. S. 240, 256-257 (1891); Mahler v. Norwich & N. Y. Transp. Co., 35
N. Y., at 356.
'Coke, Fourth Institute, cap. 22, 140 (describing as inland waters those
anns of the sea "where a man standing on one side of the land may see
what is done on the other.").
5
M. Hale, De Jure Maris et Branchiorum ejusdem cap. iv (1667), reprinted in R. Hall, Essay on the Rights of the Crown and the Privileges of
the Subject in the Sea Shores of the Realm App. vii (2d ed. 1875) ("That
ann or branch of the sea, which lies within the fauces terrae, where a man
may reasonably discerne between shore and shore, is, or at least may be
within the body of a county, and therefore within the jurisdiction of the
sheriff or coroner." (citation omitted)).
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that is "clear beyond doubt." For purposes of our decision,
we put to one side the parties' argument about the burden
and assume that Lord Hale's test is satisfied. 6 On the assumption that Nantucket Sound could have been considered
"county waters" under the common law of England in the
17th century, we nevertheless conclude that Massachusetts
cannot prevail under the doctrine of "ancient title" on which
it relies.
II
This Court has consistently followed principles of international law in fixing the coastline of the United States. 7 We
have relied in particular on the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone, adopted on April 29, 1958, 15
U. S. T. 1607, T. I. A. S. 5639. 8 The Convention provides
that the sovereignty of a state extends to "internal waters."
Article 1. The Convention also contains a set of rules delimiting those waters. Generally speaking, Article 3 defines
The Special Master rested his conclusion that Massachusetts had to
prove its claim "clear beyond doubt" on two cases of this Court and three
reports of Special Masters in other original jurisdiction cases. See Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S. 11, 77 (1969); United States v. California,
381 U. S. 139, 175 (1965); Report of the Special Master, 0. T. 1984, No. 35
Orig., p. 11; Report of the Special Master, 0. T. 1974, No. 9 Orig.,
pp. 18-19; Report of the Special Master, 0. T. 1973, No. 52 Orig., p. 42.
Cf. Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, - - U.S. - - ,·
- - (1985) (slip op. 18-19).
Although the Master's conclusion regarding the burden of proof was the
focus of the Commonwealth's opening brief, we find it unnecessary to address the issue given our disposition of the case. Whatever the measure of
proof, Massachusetts concedes that it bears the risk of nonpersuasion.
See Brief for Defendant 7.
7
See United States v. California, 381 U. S., at 161-167. See also Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case,-- U. S., at-- (slip op. 4:_5);
United States v. Maine (Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case),
- U . S . - , - (1985) (slip op. 8-9); United States v. Alaska, 422
U. S. 184, 188-189 (1975); Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 35.
8
See Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 21 (Convention contains
"'the best and most workable definitions available'" (quoting United States
v. California, 381 U. S., at 165)) .
6

..
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"internal waters" as those waters landward of a baseline
which Article 5(1) in turn defines as "the low-water line along
the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized
by the coastal states." Of importance to this case, the Convention also includes as a state's "internal waters" those waters enclosed in "bays" as defined in Article 7. Most of the
rules in this Article identify the criteria for defining "juridical" bays, but Article 7(6) further includes as "bays" "socalled 'historic' bays" and waters landward of baselines
marked when "the straight baseline system provided for in
article 4 is applied."
In this case, Massachusetts relies exclusively on the provision recognizing "historic bays," for it is agreed both that the
United States has legitimately eschewed the straight baseline method for determining its boundaries, 9 and that Nantucket Sound does not qualify as a juridical bay. Because
"historic bay" is not defined in the Convention, we have previously relied on a United Nations study authored by the
U. N. Secretariat and entitled Juridical Regime of Historic
Waters, Including Historical Bays, [1962] 2 Y. B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 1, U. N. Doc. AJCN.4/143 (1962) (hereinafter "Juridical Regime"). See Alabama and Mississippi Boundary
Case,- U. S. - , - (1985) (slip op. 8-9). That study
prescribes the three factors of dominion, continuity, and international acquiescence recognized in our own cases for
identifying a "historic bay." 10 The Commonwealth submits
We have previously held that the decision to use the straight baseline
system provided for in Article 4 of the Convention rests with the Federal
Government. See Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case,- U. S.,
a t - (slip op. 6); Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 72-73; United
States v. California, 381 U. S., at 167-168.
10
"The term 'historic bay' is not defined in the Convention and there is no
complete accord as to its meaning. The Court has stated that a historic
bay is a bay 'over which the coastal nation has traditionally asserted and
maintained dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations.' United
States v. California, 381 U. S., at 172. See also United States v. Alaska,
422 U.S., at 189; Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U.S., at 23. The Court
9
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that the three part test is actually the standard for finding
"historic title" and that a different doctrine-the doctrine of
"ancient title"-is also a sufficient basis for identifying a "historic bay" under Article 7(6) of the Convention. According
to Massachusetts, "historic title" is the maritime counterpart
of title acquired by adverse possession. It is prescriptive in
character because it arises as a result of a state's exercise of
dominion over water that would otherwise constitute either
high seas or territorial sea in which all ships enjoy the right
of innocent passage. Before this Court, Massachusetts no
longer claims "historic title" as it uses the term. Brief for
Defendant 4; Reply Brief for Defendant 22.
The Commonwealth instead relies entirely on a claim of
"ancient title." This is the first case in which we have been
asked to evaluate such a claim to coastal waters. According
to the Juridical Regime, an "ancient title" is based on a
state's discovery and occupation of territory unclaimed by
any other sovereign when it was first acquired. To claim
"ancient title" to waters that would otherwise constitute high
seas or territorial sea, a state must
"affir[m] that the occupation took place before the freedom of the high seas became part of international law.
In that case, the State would claim acquisition of the
area by an occupation which took place long ago.
also has noted that there appears to be general agreement that at least
three factors are to be taken into consideration in determining whether a
body of water is a historic bay: (1) the exercise of authority over the area
by the claiming nation; (2) that continuity of this exercise of authority; and
(3) the acquiescence of foreign nations. See United States v. Alaska, 422
U. S., at 189; Louisiana Boundary Case, 394 U. S., at 75 and 23-24, n. 27.
An authoritative United Nations study concludes that these three factors
require that 'the coastal State must have effectively exercised sovereignty
over the area continuously during a time sufficient to create a usage and
have done so under the general toleration of the community of States.' J uridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays 56, U. N. Doc.
A/CN.4/143 (1962)." Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case, U. S., a t - - - (footnotes omitted) (slip op. 8-9).

'.
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Strictly speaking, the State would, however, not assert a
historic title, but an ancient title based on occupation as
an original mode of acquisition of territory. The difference is subtle but should in the interest of clarity be not
overlooked: to base the title on occupation is to base it on
a clear original title which is fortified by long usage."
Juridical Regime, supra, at 12 (~ 71) (emphasis added).
Assuming, arguendo, that waters that would otherwise be
considered high seas or territorial sea may be claimed under
a theory of "ancient title," both parties agree that effective
"occupation" must have taken place before the freedom of the
high seas became a part of international law. Tr. of Oral
Arg. 16-17, 34; Brief for Defendant 4. By this analysis, the
title must have been perfected no later than the latter half of
the 18th century. 11
One cannot, as a historical matter, point to a precise date on which the
international community would have rejected an assertion of sovereignty
over Nantucket Sound as contrary to international law. It is clear, however, that such a claim would have become progressively less tenable
throughout the eighteenth century:
"The seventeenth century marked the heyday of the mare clausum (closed
sea) with claims by England, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Genoa, Tuscany,
the Papacy, Turkey, and Venice.
"In the eighteenth century the position changed completely. Dutch policies had favoured freedom of navigation and fishing in the previous century, and the great publicist Grotius had written against the Portuguese
monopoly of navigation and commerce in the East Indies. After the accession of William of Orange to the English throne in 1689 English disputes
with Holland over fisheries ceased. However, sovereignty of the sea was
still asserted against France, and in general the formal requirement of the
salute to the flag was maintained. By the late eighteenth century the
claim to sovereignty was obsolete and the requirement of the flag ceremony was ended in 1805. After 1691 extensive Danish claims were reduced by stages to narrow fixed limits. By the late eighteenth century the
cannon-shot rule predominated, and claims to large areas of sea faded
away." L. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 233-234 (2d
ed. 1973) (footnotes omitted).
11
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III
Although the Special Master discussed "the history of
[Nantucket Sound], especially [its] role in the development of
the colonial economy of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket Island," Report 27, his discussion leaves us in doubt whether
he felt that "the colonists' exploitation of the marine resources of the soun[d] was equivalent to a formal assumption
of sovereignty over" it before freedom of the seas became
generally recognized. I d., at 58. 12 Because the Commonwealth relied on the same historical evidence to establish
both "historic" and "ancient" title, and because "the ultimate
responsibility for deciding what are correct findings of fact
remains with us" in any event, 13 we have examined for ourselves the pertinent exhibits and transcripts. Our independent review leads us to conclude that the Commonwealth did
not effectively "occupy" Nantucket Sound so as to obtain
"clear original title" and fortify that title "by long usage" before the seas were recognized to be free.
"[I]t is an undeniable fact that, since the days of Grotius, the principle of
the freedom of the high seas found an ever wider currency and that, after a
gradual evolution, it gained the upper hand towards the beginning of the
nineteenth century, when it crystallized into a universally accepted principle of international law." Y. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law
§ 61, pp. 242-243 (1965).
We find it unnecessary to select a "critical date" upon which the community of states would have rejected a British claim to Nantucket Sound.
Because the colonists' activities changed gradually in character and intensity over time, we need say only that effective "occupation" must have ripened into "clear original title," "fortified by long usage," no later than the
latter half of the 1700s.
12
The Special Master discussed this history only as regards "historic"
title, see Report 27, even though he recognized that "[e]ffective occupation, from a time prior to the victory of the doctrine of freedom of the seas"
is necessary "to establish a valid claim to a body of water under ancient
title," id., at 25-26.
18
Colorado v. New Mexico, - . -U.S. - - , - - (1984) (slip op. 6).
See Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case,-- U. S., at-- (slip op.
8) and cases cited therein.

·'
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Massachusetts relies on the colonists' "intensive and exclusive exploitation" of the marine resources of Nantucket
Sound to establish occupation. Reply Brief for Defendant
17. At the outset, we have some difficulty appraising the
Commonwealth's historical evidence because the cases and
publications cited to us uniformly discuss occupation in the
context of "historic" rather than "ancient" title. Assuming
that the parties are correct in their unspoken assumption
that occupation sufficient to establish "historic title" resembles that necessary to acquire "ancient title" as well, and further assuming that such title extends to the whole of the waters of the Sound and is not merely a right to exploit its
resources, we believe that occupation requires, at a minimum, the existence of acts, attributable to the sovereign,
manifesting an assertion of exclusive authority over the waters claimed. 14 The history of the two most publicized cases
conveys the international understanding of occupation.
In the Fisheries Case (U. K. v. Nor.), 1951 I. C. J. 116,
the Permanent International Court of Justice upheld Norway's use of straight baselines (now approved expressly by
Article 7(6) of the Convention), in part because Norway had
proved a historic claim to the "comparatively shallow'' waters
between the mainland and the fringing islands known as the
Skjaergaard, or "rock rampart." The Court acknowledged
1
'

The Juridical Regime quotes two definitions of "occupation":
"[Occupation] is defined by Oppenheim as follows:
'Occupation is the act of appropriation by a State by which it intentionally
acquires sovereignty over such territory as is at. the time not under the
sovereignty of another State.'
A similar definition is given by Fauchille:
'Generally speaking, occupation is the taking by a State, with the intention
of acting as the owner, of something which does not belong to any other
State but which is susceptible of sovereignty.'" Juridical Regime, supra,
at 12 (~ 70).
On the possible difference between occupation as a mode of original acquisition of territory as contrasted to occupation eventuating in prescriptive
acquisition, see M. Strohl, The International Law of Bays 328, n. 27 (1963).
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that Norwegian fishermen had exploited-fishing grounds in
this region "from time immemorial," id., at 127, and that the
King of Denmark and Norway had excluded fishermen from
other States "for a long period, from 1616-1618 until 1906."
Id., at 124; see id., at 142.
Of similar effect is the case of Annakumary Pillai v.
Muthupayal, 27 Indian L. Rep. 551 (Mad. Ser. 1903). The
complainant in that case was a lessee of the Rajah of Ramnad
who accused the defendant of stealing chanks (mollusks) from
the seabed five miles off the Ramnad coast. The Indian
High Court upheld its own jurisdiction and the liability of the
defendant "upon the immemorial claim of the land sovereign
over this body of water." P. Jessup, The Law of Territorial
Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction 16 (1927) (footnote omitted). The Officiating Chief Judge, relying on historical evidence dating from the 6th century B. C. and explaining the
concessions under which chanks and pearls were historically
gathered by the state's licensees, declared that "it would be
impossible to ignore the fact that for ages in this country,
chanks and pearl oysters have been owned and enjoyed by
the sovereign as belonging by prerogative right exclusively
to him." 27 Indian L. Rep., at 557. "And [because] chanks
as well as pearl oysters while still in the beds have always
been taken to be the exclusive property of the sovereign, . . .
the fishery operations connected therewith have always been
carried on under State control and have formed a source of
revenue to the exchequer." Id., at 554. The Officiating
Chief Judge concluded that this history demonstrated "exclusive occupation" of "the fisheries in question." I d., at 566. 15
16

Because of a division of opinion between the Officiating Chief Judge
and the second judge on the two-judge panel, the case was subsequently
heard by a three-judge panel. The later panel unanimously agreed with
the judgment of the Officiating Chief Judge and with his historical analysis.
See Annakumary Pillai v. Muthupayal, 27 Indian L. Rep. 551, 572 (Mad.
Ser. 1903).
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We have encountered additional examples of claims to title
based on exploitation of marine resources-the pearl fisheries in Australia, Mexico, and Columbia, the oyster beds in the
Bay of Granville and off the Irish Coast, the coral beds off the
coasts of Algeria, Sardinia, and Sicily, and various grounds in
which herring, among other fishes, are found. See T. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea 696-698 (1911). The continuation of apparently longstanding state regulation over
these fisheries does not contradict, and is indeed perfectly
consistent with, the understanding of occupation reflected in
the Norwegian and Indian cases just discussed.
In contrast, the historical evidence introduced by Massachusetts does not show effective occupation of Nantucket
Sound. To be sure, the Commonwealth's expert witness on
the history of the Sound, Dr. Louis DeVorsey, a historical
geographer, did conclude that Nantucket Sound was part of
an "amphibious resource region" due to the "intimate relationship" between the inhabitants of the area and the surrounding waters. 16 By this Dr. De Vorsey meant essentially
that the residents took their livelihood from the sea. Although fascinating from a historical geographer's point of interest, the testimony of Dr. De Vorsey and the exhibits introduced through him do not satisfy the legal threshold for
occupation of a coastal water body.
To begin with,. the opinion that Nantucket Sound formed
part of an "amphibious resource region" does not prove occupation of the .entirety of Nantucket Sound. That conclusion
was based largely on activity which undoubtedly took place
16
Dr. De Vorsey inferred this intimate relationship in part from 17th and ·
18th century maps naming prominent features and attempting to chart the
depths of Nantucket Sound. As Dr. DeVorsey acknowledged, however,
none of these maps identified Nantucket Sound as a separate body of water
even though they did identify other bodies of water such as Cape Cod Bay,
Buzzard's Bay, and, in two instances, Vineyard Sound. These early maps
do not support Massachusetts' contention that the area's inhabitants established a special relationship with the protected waters of Nantucket Sound
as opposed to the surrounding waters and ocean in general.
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either within territorial waters or on dry land. For example, to evidence the colonists' close relationship with the sea,
Dr. DeVorsey pointed to the use of sand for glassmaking,
stone polishing, and farming. Other activities, such as the
building of mills powered by the tide, the making of salt from
sea water, and the gathering of seaweed for fertilizer and insulation, also fail to establish occupation of Nantucket Sound.
Even considering this evidence together with the more
water-based pursuits of harvesting oysters and clams and
hunting whales, we do not find sufficient evidence of occupation of Nantucket Sound as a whole. Massachusetts concedes that oysters were dug mainly in the harbors, and for
decades the colonists' exploitation of whales was restricted to
those that had drifted onto the beach. Although the residents by the mid-18th century had developed a technique for
driving whales onto beaches by pursuing them in modified
four to five man Indian canoes, and they certainly caught
shellfish and clams outside the shallow water near shore,
there is no satisfactory evidence that these activities occurred over the entirety of Nantucket Sound, and in particular over the portion of the Sound which the United States
contends is high seas.
The evidence of occupation adduced by Massachusetts is
also deficient because it does not warrant a finding that the
colonists asserted an exclusive right to the waters of Nanoccu~ion ~uc· by
tucket Sound.
he e ·dence
assa~se is a~defic1 t beca
it do not arra a
ing t t the o~o~~sse d an
clusiv rign o t
wat
of Na uck So una The closest the Commonwea th
comes is a 1672 con rae by which the Town of Nantucket attempted to engage a whaler by the name of Lopar to "follow
the trade of whaling on the island" for two years ~ exchange
for, inter alia, an exclusive license to hunt whales and ten
acres of land. There is no evidence that the contract was
carried out (and in particular no record of a conveyance of
real property), and no suggestion in the contract that the li-
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cense was limited, or even especially concerned with, whaling
in Nantucket Sound. Indeed, the contract does not clearly
reflect an exclusive proprietary interest in whales anywhere:
it may simply represent a covenant on the part of the Nantucket islanders not to compete with the whaling company or
companies chartered under the proposed contract. The only
other evidence of an assertion of exclusive control was a 1692
Colonial Resolve to build a vessel to protect coastal ships in
Vineyard Sound against the depredations of New Yorkers,
with whom a dispute was brewing at the time. 17 But this evidence concerning Vineyard Sound merely highlights the lack
of any comparable evidence concerning Nantucket Sound.
In the absence of evidence limiting use of Nantucket Sound to
the inhabitants of its shores, there is no reason to exempt
these waters from such rights as innocent passage traditionally enjoyed in common by all members of the international
polity.
Even if Massachusetts had introduced evidence of intensive and exclusive exploitation of the entirety of Nantucket
Sound, we would still be troubled by the lack of any linkage
between these activities and the English Crown. Cf. United
States v. Alaska, 422 U. S. 184, 190-191, 203 (1975). Unless
we are to believe that the self-interested endeavors of every
sea-faring community suffices to establish "ancient title" to
the waters containing the fisheries and resources it exploits,
without regard to continuity of usage or international acquiescence necessary to establish "historic title," solely because exploitation predated the freedom of the seas, then the
Commonwealth's claim cannot be 'recognized. Accordingly,
we find that the colonists of Nantucket Sound did not effectively occupy that body of water; as a consequence, Great
17
The dispute was resolved peacefully, there is no evidence that the vessel was built, and the only other patrol vessel of which Dr. De Vorsey testified was engaged in convoying merchantmen, not in protecting Nantucket
Sound.
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Britain did not obtain title which could devolve upon
Massachusetts.
IV
Our determination that Massachusetts had not established
clear title prior to freedom of the seas is corroborated by the
Commonwealth's consistent failure to assert dominion over
Nantucket Sound since that time. 18 Three examples should
suffice to demonstrate that during the 18th and 19th centuries Massachusetts continued to treat Nantucket Sound in a
manner inconsistent with its recent characterization of that
body as internal waters. ·
First, in 1847, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts issued an opinion which is generally understood as having adopted Lord Coke's more demanding version of the lineof-sight test for determining whether jaws of land enclosed
inland waters. 19 Since it is agreed that Nantucket Sound
See Temple of Preah Vihear, 1962 I. C. J. 6, 61 (separate opinion of
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice) ("It is a general principle of law ... that a party's
attitude, state of mind or intentions at a later date can be regarded as good
evidence-in relation to the same or closely connected matter-<>f his attitude, state of mind or intentions at an earlier date also; ... the existence of
a state of fact, or of a situation, at a later date may furnish good presumptive evidence of its existence at an earlier date also, even where the later
situation or state of affairs has in other respects to be excluded from consideration." (citations omitted)).
While the position of Massachusetts is discussed in text, it bears mention
that the United States did not assert sovereignty over Nantucket Sound
either. In 1789 the First Congress established a customs enforcement
system, which included a number of separate districts in Massachusetts.
The statutory definition of the District of Nantucket included "the Island of
Nantucket" without any reference to adjacent waters, whereas the District
of Edgartown, which included Martha's Vineyard and the Elizabeth Islands, expressly incorporated "all the waters and shores" within Duke
County. Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 31. This distinction was repeated in subsequent legislation in 1790, Act of Aug. 4, 1790, 1 Stat. 145,
146, and in 1799, Act of Mar. 2, 1799, 1 Stat. 627, 629.
19
In Commonwealth v. Peters, 53 Mass. 387, 392 (1847), the Massachusetts high court held:
18
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could not qualify as inland waters under ·the Coke test, the
Court's decision that that test was part of the common law of
Massachusetts supports the further conclusion that the
Sound was not part of the internal waters of the
Commonwealth.
This conclusion was confirmed in 1859 when the Massachusetts legislature enacted a statute defining the seaward
boundary of the Commonwealth at one marine league (or
three nautical miles) from the coast. See Acts of 1859,
Chapter 289, Mass. Ex. 53. In accordance with this measure, the statute treated arms of the sea as part of the Commonwealth if the distance between their headlands did not
exceed two marine leagues. Thus, the statute replaced the
ambiguous line-of-sight test for applying the inter fauces terrae doctrine with a fixed standard of six nautical miles.
Since the distance between Monomoy Point and Nantucket
Island is admittedly more than six nautical miles, Massachusett's statutory definition of its own coastline excluded Nantucket Sound.
"All creeks, havens, coves, and inlets lying within projecting headlands
and islands, and all bays and arms of the sea lying within and between
lands not so wide but that persons and objects on the one side can be discerned by the naked eye by persons on the opposite side, are taken to be
within the body of the county."
Chief Judge Shaw's adoption of the Coke test in Peters is consistent with
Judge Story's earlier exposition in United States v. Crush, 26 Fed. Cas. 48,
52 (C. C. D. Mass. 1829):
"I do not understand by this expression that it is necessary that the shores
should be so near, that all that is done on one shore could be discerned, and
testified to with certainty, by persons standing on the opposite shore; but
that objects on the opposite shore might be reasonably discerned, that is
might be distinctly seen with the naked eye and clearly distinguished from
each other."
The parties do not disagree with the Master's conclusion that the American
view of the proper test, which followed Coke, differed from the British
view, which followed Hale.

~
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Finally, in 1881, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a
statute directing its Harbor and Land Commission to prepare
charts identifying the boundaries that had been established
by the 1859 law. Official charts prepared pursuant to that
legislation are consistent with the Master's conclusion that
Vineyard Sound was considered part of the Commonwealth,
but that Nantucket Sound was not.
It was not until 1971 that Massachusetts first asserted its
claim to jurisdiction over Nantucket Sound. There is simply
no evidence that the English Crown or its colonists had obtained "clear original title" to the Sound in the 17th century,
or that such title was "fortified by long usage." Without
such evidence, we are surely not prepared to enlarge the exception in Article 7(6) of the Convention for historic bays to
embrace a claim of "ancient title" like that advanced in this
case. 20
The parties are directed to prepare and submit a decree
conforming to the recommendations of the Special Master.

It is so ordered.

00

The validity of and any limits to the "ancient title" theory are accordingly reserved for an appropriate case. In view of our decision that the
history of Nantucket Sound does not support the acquisition of "ancient
title" by Massachusetts, we similarly decline to address the question
whether the Commonwealth abandoned or renounced that title, and the antecedent issue of under what standard that judgment should be made.
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